The Russian-American « Diesel Deal » : Unlikely to Stop the War in Ukraine

Analyse d'Igor Delanoë sur les enjeux du deal sur le diesel entre la Russie et les Etats-Unis, publiée par le Middle East Institute Switzerland.




On 9 October 2026, the United States and Russia announced that they had reached a deal on diesel. Although largely symbolic given the volumes involved (2.2 million metric tons, or three days’ worth of consumption in the United States), the deal nonetheless reflects the United States’ growing distance from Kyiv. Above all, it is part of a new White House approach to resolving the conflict in Ukraine. For Russia, the deal changes nothing in substance. The diesel agreement and the OFAC licence for Russian diesel imports, valid until 7 April 2027, will provide little more than a brief inflow of cash to Russian finances, and Russia’s “scorched earth” strategy in the conflict remains unchanged. Following its disillusionment after the Anchorage meeting in August 2025, the Kremlin is relying more than ever on the battlefield to force Ukraine’s surrender in 2027.




A Russian-American agreement on diesel was announced during a phone call between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin on 9 October. Since then, the United States will receive 2.2 million metric tons of Russian diesel, and the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued a general licence for diesel imports from Russia valid for six months. The Russian government subsequently lifted its ban on diesel exports.

Given the volume involved, the rationale behind this deal is not economic but symbolic and political: the arrival of 2.2 million metric tons of diesel – equivalent to three days’ worth of consumption in the United States – in the coming weeks will have only a negligible impact on fuel prices for American voters ahead of the midterm elections on 3 November. For Russia, the OFAC licence will bring some relief to the strained Russian federal budget, but it will not enable the country’s economy to rebound. Despite rising energy prices, the World Bank projects Russian growth of 0.8 percent this year and 0.7 percent next year, and the IMF 0.9 percent in both years. This commentary argues that the deal signals a new US approach – business incentives for Moscow and growing pressure on Kyiv – that is unlikely to end the war while Russia expects military gains to strengthen its negotiating position.

A Transactional Approach to the War

When the deal was announced, US negotiators Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were meeting Ukrainian negotiators in Florida, together with the European troika – or E3, consisting of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, represented by their national security advisers – as well as representatives from the EU and NATO. The discussions focused on a new US initiative to achieve a ceasefire in Ukraine. This meeting was part of a new diplomatic phase made possible by CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow in late August.

The Trump administration’s approach to resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has shifted in recent months. The US administration now separates the resolution of the war from the conclusion of business deals. These deals – partial lifting of sanctions, future investments in the energy and extractive sectors – are intended, according to this new logic, to stimulate the previously fruitless dialogue with Russia and break the deadlock in negotiations. The US administration has used Belarus as a “testing ground” for this approach: US sanctions on Belarusian potash companies were lifted in exchange for the release of political prisoners in 2025 and 2026.

The partial lifting of sanctions on diesel can be seen as the first step in this new approach, and thus an overture – some might say a concession – towards Moscow. US negotiators Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner presented their Ukrainian and European counterparts with a new initiative comprising four sets of measures that reflect this business-oriented and realist approach: first, Kyiv would receive “Article 5-style” NATO security guarantees but no NATO membership, a point that was already known. Second, the reconstruction of Ukraine would involve the World Bank and the US investment firm BlackRock. Third, “economic integration” between Russia, Ukraine and the European Union would include an energy component. Reports of US investments in the Nord Stream gas pipelines have recurred since Donald Trump’s return to the White House. Finally, the plan provides for a ceasefire that would be declared along the line of contact – a prospect that Volodymyr Zelensky has already accepted, having written in his 4 June 2026 open letter to Vladimir Putin that “diplomacy begins at the line of contact.” The Financial Times also reported on the proposal made by US negotiators – again in Florida – to transfer part of the Central Bank of Russia’s assets frozen at Euroclear to US jurisdiction.

Shifting Pressure from Moscow to Kyiv

A second characteristic of this new US approach is a greater willingness to put pressure on Ukraine. This marks a change. Although Donald Trump has often appeared more sympathetic to the Russian president than to Volodymyr Zelensky, his statements have fluctuated over the past 18 months, and his administration imposed sanctions in October 2025 on the Russian energy companies Lukoil and Rosneft. That said, these sanctions are part of a broader strategy of economic warfare and competition among global energy majors, with Ukraine serving more as a pretext for sanctioning these companies. According to media reports, a consortium including Gulf investors with business ties to US negotiators may acquire Lukoil’s foreign assets at a steep discount as part of the war settlement.

Since the diesel deal was announced, this pressure has become explicit. On 10 October, Donald Trump called on the Ukrainian president to resign, arguing that he is not capable of “striking a deal” with the Russian president. Donald Trump has also portrayed the Russian-American diesel deal as a “punishment” for Ukraine’s continued strikes against Russian refineries, despite calls from the White House to cease them. This framing also allows him to shift responsibility for the rise in energy prices, to which the US military campaign against Iran from late February 2026 also contributed. On 12 October, the Ukrainian government announced that it was no longer receiving early warnings from the US about Russian ballistic missile launches. Besides, the Ukrainian military has begun experiencing problems with long-range UAVs. Flights must now be carefully planned to ensure they do not exceed the 100 miles per hour speed limit above which the Ukrainians can no longer use SpaceX services to control their drones. Although this “wake-up call” lasted only a few days, the US administration demonstrated that it was prepared to pressure Ukraine just as new US ceasefire proposals were being considered by Kyiv and European leaders.

Through this deal, Donald Trump is continuing to follow the approach he has taken from the outset regarding the war in Ukraine: distancing himself from Kyiv and ensuring that US involvement in this crisis yields benefits for the United States. However, there has been a shift in Trump’s modus operandi: while securing short-term gains through tactical manoeuvres remains the US president’s preferred approach, his actions in recent days are part of a medium-term strategy aimed at breaking the deadlock in Russian-Ukrainian negotiations by putting pressure on Kyiv. The diesel deal also diverts attention from an unpopular US Iran policy that voters may blame for higher energy costs.

Limited Prospects for a Ceasefire

Whether this approach will succeed is far from certain: European governments and Kyiv, which reject the US proposals, have no intention of giving in, even though the cost of supporting Kyiv is becoming increasingly burdensome for the EU. To date, Trump has succeeded in one regard in this war: he has significantly reduced the risk of direct escalation between the United States and Russia. However, the US could still be drawn into a conflict with Russia if the current escalation between Russia and European states continues to the point of direct confrontation.

On the battlefield, Russian forces have been methodically destroying numerous energy and heating facilities for several months. The Ukrainian capital has been subjected to regular strikes throughout the day since the end of summer. Russia’s new jet-powered Geran-5 drones fly faster and farther and carry heavier payloads. Running low on missiles for their Patriot batteries, Ukrainian forces are unable to intercept them effectively. Russia has thus regained the initiative in the air campaign, counting on winter to wear down Ukraine and on the upcoming political shifts in Europe, where half of the electorate will go to the polls in the coming months. In other words, the Russian leadership believes, rightly or wrongly, that it will be in a stronger negotiating position by spring 2027. The diesel deal does not change this calculation: as long as the Kremlin expects time to work in its favour, US business incentives are unlikely to produce a ceasefire.




Photo : Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump at their August 2025 summit in Anchorage, Alaska.